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Introduction 
Despite a long history of agricultural protectionism on both sides of the border, the past 20 years 
have seen tremendous strides in liberalized U.S.-Mexico trade. Notable are the implementation 
of Mexican economic and sector reforms beginning in the 1980's, in which the protectionist 
Sistema Alimentario Mexicano was abolished and the agricultural budget was slashed (Merrill 
and Miro 2005), and the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994.  
Over the past decade, Mexico’s agricultural sector has had progressively less government 
support each year, while agricultural exports in the 1990's to the U.S. grew at a striking annual 
rate of 11.5 percent (Chamber of Commerce 1999).  On the import side, by 2002, Mexico had 
grown to be the third largest market for U.S. agricultural exports.  
  However, protectionism remains high in both U.S. and Mexican rice markets, the sector 
of interest here. Payments to U.S. rice growers totaled more than $1.2 billion in 2004.  In 
Mexico, just prior to the scheduled removal of tariffs on U.S. milled rice imports in 2003, the 
protests of millers led to Mexico's imposing a 10 percent anti-dumping duty and amending its 
trade laws to facilitate future punitive actions (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2005). The new duty outraged U.S. millers who saw a return to the protected markets of the past.  
Though both countries protect their rice sectors, these are two dramatically different industries. 
U.S. rice production is highly capitalized and efficient, with yields among the highest in the 
world (Economic Research Service, 2004). The U.S. distribution system is also highly efficient. 
Widespread on-farm drying of rice results in low levels of spoilage and high grain quality. The 
U.S. rice milling system enjoys scale economies and is highly competitive.  Although U.S. 
producers only 2% of global rice production, about 40% of the U.S. rice crop is exported -   2 
mostly long-grain milled rice - with the U.S. accounting for about 12% of global rice trade.  Due 
to tariff escalation, most exports to Mexico and Central America are in rough (unmilled) form. 
These exports grew tremendously in the 1990-2004 period, with trade volume increasing more 
than six-fold to more than 731,000 metric tons (FAO, 2005).    
  By contrast, Mexican rice production faces significant constraints. Mexican rice mills are 
more numerous than American rice mills, but there are far fewer commercially viable operations.  
The vast majority are relatively inefficient community-run mills situated near ejidos. Large 
numbers of Mexican mills have closed within the past 15 years with thousands of job losses. The 
industry has become highly concentrated, with six mills estimated to process 90% of all rice 
milled in Mexico (Rindermann and Cruz, 1999; Fellin, Fuller and Salin, 2000). 
  Given the recent environment of significant changes in bilateral trade policy and industry 
competitiveness, this paper seeks to examine the extent to which trade policy and a resumption 
of protectionism has affected market integration and efficiency in North American rice markets. 
We examine whether the trade in milled rice has adhered to the principles of specialization 
according by comparative advantage. We analyze prices in 10 markets in the U.S. and Mexico, 
and examine market integration by testing price convergence and co-movement through a 
sequential process.  We begin by examining descriptive statistics of prices, market price 
differentials, and effective tariffs. We then use bivariate cointegration to identify the existence of 
equilibrium relationships between market pairs over both the medium and long term.  
Multivariate cointegration is carried out so that the boundaries of continuous markets may be 
determined.  Finally, markets with stable long-run relationships are subjected to impulse 
response analysis, yielding insights into the speed at which deviations from equilibrium are 
corrected. The conclusions and implications of the analysis are discussed in the last section.   3 
Mexico and U.S. Market Data 
Mexican rice market data are weekly prices of long grain milled rice reported at wholesale 
distribution centers (centrales de abasto) in southern and central Mexico, and collected by the 
National System of Integration and Integration of Markets (SNIIM).  Only a small number of 
market locations report data with any regularity; seven market locations were selected on the 
basis of quality and consistency of price data. The Federal District market (serving Mexico City) 
is the largest of all wholesale markets, with the best transportation and access to millers. The 
Guadalajara market in Jalisco is the second largest, has good infrastructure, and is home to one 
of Mexico's six dominant millers.  The other Mexican markets are smaller, in some cases more 
remote, and generally served by a greater share of domestic production versus imports.   The 
original price data were reported in pesos per kg for 50 kg bags of rice. These prices were then 
converted to U.S. dollars using average weekly market dollar-peso spot rates.  
  For the U.S., we use weekly FOB prices at the milling site per hundredweight of long-
grain milled rice in the three largest productive areas of the country, Arkansas, Louisiana and 
Texas. The data are from regular surveys conducted by the USDA's Agricultural Marketing 
Service. Arithmetic averages of reported high and low weekly prices were used. Arkansas is 
home to Riceland Foods, one of two companies found not to be dumping in Mexico's 2002 
investigation and thus able to export its goods to Mexico duty-free (Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, 2004). Louisiana is important for its good ocean freight access. Texas (Houston) 
is the primary point from which U.S. exports leave to Mexico by truck, rail and ocean freight.  
  To examine medium-term changes in market integration, the time series are analyzed 
over the entire period, 1998:1 to 2002:52 (denoting year and week), and three subperiods. The 
first period, 1998:1 to 2000:17, represents a period of relatively high tariffs (10%, declining to   4 
6%) and, as we will see, large U.S.-Mexico spatial price differentials. On average, the price 
differential between U.S. and Mexican markets was $10.43 per 50 kg of rice, with the tariff 
accounting for about $1.54.  The second period, from 2000:18 to 2002:35, is characterized by 
lower tariffs (6%, declining to 2%) but higher price differentials.  The average cross-border price 
differential was $12.83, to which tariffs contributed only 58 cents.  The anti-dumping duty of 
10.18 percent takes effect shortly before the beginning of the third subperiod, from 2002:36 to 
2004:52, and persists throughout it.  The average price differential in this subsample is $8.91, 
with the tariff contributing about $1.53.  Nonetheless, in this period prices converge and trade 
volumes increase, suggesting that while the Mexican tariff structure affords substantial 
protection to millers, excess demand remains a major determinant of trade volumes (given that 
Mexico’s milling capacity is fixed in the short run). During this period, subsidy support to 
Mexican rice producers increased which may account in part for the declining prices.  
 
Empirical Modeling and Results 
Given paper length limitations, the analysis is briefly summarized in seven stages. Due to the 
extent of the time-series results, we only cited the methods used, report selective results, and 
describe others qualitatively as space allows. Full details are available in Anonymous, 2005.  
Descriptive Statistics. To begin, it is informative to examine descriptive statistics of the 
univariate time series to provide a starting point for comparative market analysis.  Table 1 shows 
that the mean price of milled rice is consistently higher in Mexico than in the U.S.; the lowest 
Mexican prices are found in Mexico City, Jalisco, Oaxaca, and on the Yucatan Peninsula.  The 
low prices in Jalisco and Mexico City may be a result of the fact that large mills in Central 
Mexico and Guadalajara process a large portion of the rough rice imported into Mexico from the 
U.S., and therefore enjoy lower input costs (Fellin, Fuller and Salin 2000).  The prices in Oaxaca   5 
and Yucatan may be similarly affected by the U.S. prices due to their easy transportation access, 
particularly Yucatan’s access to the Gulf of Mexico and U.S. ports.  Prices in the smaller markets 
at Aguascalientes and Guanajuato are substantially higher than in other locations.  
Price Differentials.  We examine market price differentials among the 10 Mexican and U.S. 
markets to test the law of one price. The quantitative results (not shown) show that U.S.-Mexico 
price differentials decreased consistently from 1998 to 2004. All of the U.S. markets showed 
persistently decreasing price differentials with respect to Mexico's Federal District and Jalisco 
markets, respectively.  This seems to indicate increasingly efficient trade between the major U.S. 
and Mexican markets.  For most other markets (12 of 20 pairs with data beginning in 1998), the 
middle period (2000:18 to 2002:35) brought with it substantial increases in price differentials.   
A number of conclusions can be drawn. The cross-border price differential is typically so far in 
excess of the tariff that the tariff is not binding, and even given other transactions costs, it is 
unlikely that the tariff contributes substantially to demand decisions.  Even as they decline, 
persistently large price differentials between the U.S. and smaller Mexican markets indicate that 
strong trade linkages may not exist between the center and peripheral markets, as arbitrage 
conditions are likely violated.  With this in mind, it is unlikely that Aguascalientes (a peripheral 
market) will be cointegrated with U.S. and Central Mexican markets.  For the two largest 
markets in Mexico (Federal District and Jalisco), narrower price differentials suggest trade 
linkages, and indicate that the tariff structure is likely to have a profound influence on market 
integration, as tariffs may be binding. Lastly, narrow price differentials between U.S. markets 
support the hypothesis that these markets are well-arbitraged and highly integrated. 
The Effective Tariff.   The estimated effective tariff illustrates why Mexico’s imposition of an 
anti-dumping duty on milled rice actually provides Mexican millers with a greater degree of   6 
protection than the nominal tariff alone would suggest.  Mexican millers benefit from a low to 
nonexistent tariff on rough rice, and this duty-free import comprises a large proportion of the 
value of the finished (milled) product, thus the total protection afforded them extends beyond the 
nominal tariff.  As shown in Table 2, the level of protection afforded to Mexican millers in 2003-
2004 was greater than that which they enjoyed under seemingly less-liberal trade in 1998.  The 
imposition of the 10.18 percent anti-dumping duty in mid-2002, combined with NAFTA's 
removal of all tariffs on rough rice has resulted in a system by which Mexican millers are able to 
capture nearly 20 percent more value than they would have been under free trade.  Though this 
amount is still dramatically lower than the average price differential between U.S. and peripheral 
Mexican markets, it is likely to account for a substantial proportion of the narrow price 
differentials between U.S. markets and the central Mexican markets in the Federal District and 
Jalisco.  This simply due to the fact that price differentials in smaller markets are so large that the 
tariffs are non-binding, indicating that other forces are causing higher prices in those markets.   
Unit Root Tests for Stationarity.   The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Mackinnon, 1991; 
Greene, 2003) was used to determine whether the time series possessed a unit root, and thus the 
suitability of using cointegration models.  Both global and local unit root tests were calculated. 
The results (not shown) indicate that when the whole time series is considered, all markets 
possess a unit root, thus it is valid to carry out cointegration analysis on all markets when the full 
series is considered (Tanaka, 1999).  The null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected for Irapuato 
in the first subsample, and for Irapuato and Leon in the second subsample.  For all other market-
subperiod combinations, the null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected; stationarity of the 
first differenced series was found in all cases.  The implication of this is that cointegration 
analysis may be carried out on the sub-samples of all markets but Leon and Irapuato.   7 
Bivariate Cointegration.  Based on the properties of the data and the subsamples, we can 
hypothesize that, given importation of low-cost foreign rice into Mexico, the Mexico City market 
should tend to be cointegrated with the U.S., especially in the first two periods given relatively 
low tariffs and high price differentials.  The imposition of the anti-dumping duty may render 
integration less likely. Second, we expect Jalisco (Guadalajara), a large market in close 
proximity to one of Mexico’s largest millers and host to nearly one hundred traders, to be highly 
linked to international markets.  Finally, given the narrow price differentials and ease of transfer 
of information, it is probable that the U.S. markets will exhibit a high degree of integration over 
all time periods considered. 
  In the first subsample (1998:1 to 2000:17), virtually all market pairs show strong 
evidence of cointegration.  In 4 of 15 cases, cointegration is indicated only in one direction.  All 
of these cases involve Aguascalientes; it would seem sensible that a smaller and more isolated 
market such as Aguascalientes would act as a satellite market, its own price being a function of 
those in larger markets.  The patterns of market integration in the second period are substantially 
different from those in the first.  About half (13 of 28) of the market pairs do not exhibit 
cointegration. There is little evidence of any comovement between U.S. prices, surprisingly, 
since price differentials, while elevated, remained below fifty cents on average. All of the U.S. 
markets appear to be more closely tied to Jalisco than with one another; in fact, Jalisco appears to 
be cointegrated with every other market, underscoring its centrality in the context of the broader 
market. In the third subsample (2002:36 to 2004:52), patterns of integration appear to have 
changed once more.  U.S. markets again all appear to be cointegrated with one another at a high 
level of significance. Integration in the international market appears to have changed.  Texas is 
now cointegrated with the Yucatan market and with the Federal District.  Both of these   8 
relationships are sensible given relatively high trade volumes, with Mexico City a major 
distribution hub in the food system, and Houston and Yucatan important Gulf ports.  
  In Table 3, we show the empirical results when the entire time series is considered. The 
results are in keeping with what one might predict: large markets are integrated with one another, 
both domestically and internationally. The satellite market at Aguascalientes does not exhibit a 
significant long run relationship with the others.  All of the U.S. markets are integrated with one 
another, as are the Mexican markets (with the exception of Aguascalientes).  Internationally, 
there is strong evidence for long-run equilibrium relationships between the Federal District and 
Jalisco and the U.S. markets.  This is not surprising given that millers in these areas often employ 
imported rice, and therefore are subject to cost structures similar to American millers. 
Additionally, these markets are large in terms of number of wholesale traders and have good 
infrastructure, implying that arbitrage opportunities are better than in smaller markets.   
Multivariate Cointegration.  Multitvariate cointegration analysis allows for the delineation of 
continuous markets, so that it can be understood how each location fits into the entire market, 
giving us insights into why certain markets may be cointegrated. For instance, the finding of a 
continuous market between Gulf Coast locations might indicate that access to ocean freight is an 
important determinant of market integration.  It is not possible to identify continuous markets 
unless all locations are integrated, so we discuss here the results including only fully integrated 
sets of locations, determined by an iterative procedure detailed in Anonymous, 2005. Analysis of 
the first subsample with six markets implies that all locations are integrated with one another in 
formation of a single market; this supports the findings from the bivariate analysis and clarifies 
the results for Aguascalientes.  In the second subsample the results portray a far less cohesive 
marketplace, also in keeping with the bivariate analysis. Jalisco appears to occupy a central   9 
position on both sides of the border, serving both as a destination for U.S. rough rice and a point 
of origin for Mexican milled rice. Results for the third subsample imply that all markets are not 
integrated with one another.  When Yucatan and Aguascalientes are excluded, the markets are 
fully integrated at the five percent level. This modestly contradicts the results of the bivariate 
analysis, which gives weak evidence of integration between Texas and Yucatan and strong 
evidence of integration between the Federal District and Yucatan.  Considering these three 
markets simultaneously shows that the three series are integrated at the five percent level, 
highlighting that it is probable that the three locations comprise a single market.  The 
multivariate analysis shows that the three American markets are cointegrated with Mexico City 
and Guadalajara.  This renders the effect of the anti-dumping duty on market integration 
ambiguous, since it is difficult to posit one test of integration as superior to the other. The 
contradictory results may reflect the fact that on the one hand, a binding tariff separates the 
markets, but on the other they are linked by ongoing trade. 
  Table 4 shows Johansen cointegration test results when the series are considered in the 
long run (beginning in 1998 and 2000). The results are generally in keeping with those from the 
bivariate analysis.  In both the seven and five year samples, the omission of Aguascalientes 
results in a fully integrated market.  When Aguascalientes is included in the five year sample, it 
actually serves to reduce the rank of the cointegrating matrix.  
Impulse Response Analysis.  By mapping the responses of locations in a continuous market to a 
one-time shock in a single location, predictions can be made about how markets will respond to 
future innovations in price.  The magnitude of response and speed of convergence indicate the 
depth of market integration.  Generally, markets in the U.S. showed rapid positive responses to 
exogenous shocks, with convergence taking place between 11 and 16 weeks after the innovation.    10 
Internationally, the Federal District tended to respond quickly and positively to innovations in 
U.S. markets, though its response was of a relatively small magnitude.  Yucatan, and 
surprisingly, Jalisco demonstrated little sensitivity to innovations in U.S. markets.  Shocks in the 
Federal District generated surprisingly weak responses from the other Mexican markets, with 
small positive responses being followed by gradual convergence.  Overall, the results of the 
impulse response analysis confirm many of the findings of the cointegration models: that U.S. 
domestic markets respond fairly quickly to on another; that the Federal District is largely 
integrated with U.S. markets; and that information flows from Texas to Yucatan, unsurprising 
given both locations’ access to the Gulf.   
 
Conclusions and Implications.    
Based on cointegration results, it seems that long-run equilibrating relationships bind most 
Mexican markets - the exceptions being Aguascalientes, Leon and Irapuato - to the U.S. 
markets, and that the U.S. markets are integrated with continuity.  The small size and lack of 
proximity of the three smaller Mexican markets to transport hubs and milling centers tends to 
isolate them - like other such regional markets in Mexico - from the informational flows of the 
larger marketplace.  There are some conflicting results.  The disintegration of American markets 
in the second subsample shows that an isolated supply shock, such as a weather phenomenom, 
can have a substantial impact on whether markets are integrated.  The results for the third 
subsample indicate that the imposition of a large tariff did in fact alter the relationships between 
the affected markets, though ongoing trade may have offset the divisive effects of the tariff. 
  Given the persistently large price differentials between U.S markets and peripheral 
Mexican markets, one must wonder why the markets are not better arbitraged—especially since 
relatively small land distances separate these markets from Texas. The thinness of these markets   11 
may empower those few sellers who participate in them, leading to distortions in the form of 
monopolistic pricing (especially see the Guanajuato results).  It seems likely that retailers in 
these areas do not have access to the information necessary to transact business across the 
border.  Informal barriers such as language and customs may also prevent brokers from pursuing 
relationships with low-priced, efficient U.S producers.  In sum, the determinants of market 
integration include: access to information, trade routes, trade policy (for large markets), market 
power of sellers (for small markets), and exogenous shocks such as weather.  
  In large markets where tariffs tend to be binding, trade policy plays a key role in 
determining equilibrium market relationships. The tariff structure in rice largely determines 
whether rice consumed in Mexico will primarily be milled domestically or in the U.S. in the long 
run.  American millers are correct that Mexico’s anti-dumping duty is in fact detrimental to 
them, in spite of the fact that trade volumes in milled appear to vary independently of the tariff 
structure.  The current policy is estimated to have generated a loss to U.S. producers of $10 
million annually; the foregone gains to Mexican consumers may even be higher (Salin et al., 
2000). Removal of the anti-dumping duty on milled rice would benefit U.S. millers by creating a 
(narrow) preference for U.S. milled rice, further boosting their competitive position. 
  Given the low volume of trade in milled rice relative to that in rough rice, one can easily 
assert that the full gains from freer trade have not been realized.  While the narrow price 
differentials suggest that consumers in central markets stand only to gain marginally from price 
declines, consumers in rural markets would become substantially better off under free trade.  
While Mexico has large concentrations of urban poverty, almost all of its food insecurity is rural.  
Reducing the prices of staple foods would most greatly benefit those in remote areas.  However, 
given the apparent insulation of rural locations from the rest of the market, it is difficult to   12 
imagine how integration might be achieved; given that tariffs are not binding, conventional trade 
policy options will not generate welfare gains in peripheral markets.  Because integration is 
mainly limited to central areas, the gains from trade liberalization accruing to urban consumers 
in central Mexico are often not shared by the rural poor.   
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*Abbreviations of Markets’ Names for Use 
in the Empirical Models 
   
USLA  U.S.:  Louisiana 
USAR  U.S.:  Arkansas 
USTX  U.S.:  Texas 
CCAA  Mexico:  Aguascalientes 
DFIZ  Mexico:  Federal District 
LEON  Mexico:  Guanajuato – Leon 
IRAP  Mexico:  Guanajuato – Irapuato 
JALI  Mexico:  Jalisco 
OAXA  Mexico:  Oaxaca 
YUCA  Mexico:  Yucatan 
 
Table 2. Nominal and Effective Tariffs on Milled Rice, 1998 – 
2004 






       
1998  10.00%  5.00%  15.32% 
1999  8.00%  4.00%  11.92% 
2000  6.00%  3.00%  8.63% 
2001  4.00%  2.00%  5.51% 
2002*  4.00%  1.00%  6.18% 
2003  10.18%  0.00%  17.65% 
2004  10.18%  0.00%  18.90% 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Empirical Model* 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Max.  Min.  N 
Missing 
Values 
USLA  14.80  3.47  20.94  9.65  365  12 
USAR  14.50  3.70  20.94  8.27  365  12 
USTX  14.91  3.59  20.94  8.27  365  12 
CCAA  26.33  6.56  45.86  15.31  365  5 
DFIZ  23.35  4.51  32.28  14.91  365  0 
LEON  26.69  3.94  42.20  18.42  365  5 
IRAP  29.77  3.88  40.28  20.27  365  6 
JALI  21.21  3.96  30.56  13.19  365  9 
OAXA  21.70  3.22  31.45  14.52  261  5 
YUCA  22.21  3.04  26.93  14.98  261  5 
*Nominal tariff in 2002 calculated as time-weighted average of 2.0 percent NAFTA tariff, 
in addition to 10.18 percent anti-dumping duty.   14 
 
Table 3. Cointegration Tests on pit  =  㬐 + 㬠pjt + ut 
Full Series 
pi  pj  b  't'  CRDW  CRDF 
USLA  USAR  0.9307  147.73  0.420  -6.5017*** 
USAR  USLA  1.0567  146.76  0.421  -6.5080*** 
USLA  USTX  0.9590  143.13  0.391  -4.9646*** 
USTX  USLA  1.0249  144.35  0.390  -4.9356*** 
USLA  CCAA  0.2180  8.62  0.018  -1.9462 
CCAA  USLA  0.7786  8.60  0.068  -2.4968 
USLA  DFIZ  0.7264  55.03  0.128  -3.4721** 
DFIZ  USLA  1.2300  55.16  0.132  -3.5861** 
USLA  JALI  0.7711  35.05  0.239  -3.5141** 
JALI  USLA  1.0022  35.04  0.299  -3.8588** 
USLA   OAXA  0.6076  14.38  0.235  -1.7288 
OAXA  USLA  0.7321  14.38  0.501  -2.7952 
USLA  YUCA  0.7156  17.68  0.080  -1.9689 
YUCA  USLA  0.7656  17.68  0.121  -2.7127 
USAR  USTX  1.1020  139.49  0.391  -6.0519*** 
USTX  USAR  0.9598  129.70  0.389  -6.0150*** 
USAR  CCAA  0.2333  8.64  0.019  -1.9443 
CCAA  USAR  0.7340  8.65  0.067  -2.4894 
USAR  DFIZ  0.7760  56.64  0.139  -3.6232** 
DFIZ  USAR  1.1573  56.45  0.142  -3.7232** 
USAR  JALI  0.8263  35.93  0.254  -3.6638** 
JALI  USAR  0.9459  35.97  0.312  -3.9909** 
USAR  OAXA  0.6600  14.21  0.232  -2.1726 
OAXA  USAR  0.6654  14.22  0.497  -6.1807*** 
USAR  YUCA  0.7697  17.07  0.080  -2.2704 
YUCA  USAR  0.6890  17.07  0.120  -2.6928 
USTX  CCAA  0.2400  9.30  0.019  -1.8721 
CCAA  USTX  0.8021  9.29  0.069  -2.5282 
USTX  DFIZ  0.7640  67.02  0.177  -4.0828*** 
DFIZ  USTX  1.2108  66.90  0.182  -4.2244*** 
USTX  JALI  0.8219  40.89  0.321  -4.1226*** 
JALI  USTX  0.9996  40.80  0.381  -4.4762*** 
USTX  OAXA  0.6678  15.68  0.267  -1.8833 
OAXA  USTX  0.7307  15.67  0.534  -6.4244*** 
USTX  YUCA  0.7862  19.70  0.097  -2.5402 
YUCA  USTX  0.7639  19.70  0.140  -3.0020 
CCAA  DFIZ  0.7082  10.63  0.071  -2.6093 
DFIZ  CCAA  0.3358  10.63  0.026  -2.2891 
CCAA  JALI  0.8716  11.76  0.092  -2.9646 
JALI  CCAA  0.3172  11.75  0.102  -2.4370 
CCAA  OAXA  1.1981  9.75  0.160  -2.7189 
OAXA  CCAA  0.2248  9.75  0.397  -3.3875** 
CCAA  YUCA  1.5311  12.86  0.088  -2.4443 
YUCA  CCAA  0.2551  12.86  0.100  -2.0932 
DFIZ  JALI  1.0738  52.90  0.540  -5.4972*** 
JALI  DFIZ  0.8242  52.83  0.596  -5.7384*** 
DFIZ  OAXA  0.9598  21.95  0.543  -6.4085*** 
OAXA  DFIZ  0.6786  21.95  0.805  -8.1784*** 
DFIZ  YUCA  1.1141  30.18  0.229  -3.2681* 
YUCA  DFIZ  0.6994  30.18  0.266  -3.4937** 
JALI  OAXA  0.8437  20.78  0.628  -6.8889*** 
OAXA  JALI  0.7420  20.78  0.851  -8.4740*** 
JALI  YUCA  0.9497  24.79  0.328  -3.7326** 
YUCA  JALI  0.7417  24.79  0.326  -3.7867** 
OAXA  YUCA  0.8857  24.33  1.003  -9.4483*** 
YUCA  OAXA  0.7864  24.33  0.778  -7.9337*** 
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Table 4a. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
First Subsample for Six Markets 
1998: 1 2000:17 






Value  Eigenvalue 
r = 0  184.46  93.92  0.3688 
r ≤ 1  128.79  68.68  0.3391 
r ≤ 2  78.68  47.21  0.2943 
r ≤ 3  36.51  29.38  0.1598 
r ≤ 4  15.45  15.34  0.11 
r ≤ 5  1.34  3.84  0.011 
       
r = 5       
 
Table 4b. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Second Subsample for Eight Markets 
2000:18 2002:35 






Value  Eigenvalue 
r = 0  211.45  155.75  0.3893 
r ≤ 1  151.79  123.04  0.3307 
r ≤ 2  103.21  93.92  0.2989 
r ≤ 3  60.24  68.68  0.2261 
r ≤ 4  29.23  47.21  0.1132 
r ≤ 5  14.69  29.38  0.0704 
r ≤ 6  5.87  15.34  0.0471 
r ≤ 7  0.03  3.84  0.0002 
       
r = 3       
 
Table 4c. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Third Subsample for Eight Markets 
2002:36 2004:52 






Value  Eigenvalue 
r = 0  229.53  155.75  0.5065 
r ≤ 1  144.77  123.04  0.2894 
r ≤ 2  103.77  93.92  0.2566 
r ≤ 3  68.2  68.68  0.1887 
r ≤ 4  43.1  47.21  0.1496 
r ≤ 5  23.64  29.38  0.0995 
r ≤ 6  11.07  15.34  0.0675 
r ≤ 7  2.68  3.84  0.0221 
     
    r = 3 